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THE COURTS, DEVOLUTION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
CHRISTOPHER MCCORKINDALE,* AILEEN MCHARG** AND PAUL F SCOTT*** 
I   INTRODUCTION 
 The defining feature of the United Kingdom’s (UK) traditional constitution 
is the absence of constitutional review. The UK Parliament, since it enjoys 
unlimited sovereignty, cannot be said to have acted unlawfully, and therefore its 
acts cannot be struck down by the courts. In recent years, however, this feature of 
the constitution has come under pressure from a number of different directions,1 
including the establishment of devolved legislatures for Scotland and Northern 
Ireland in 1999,2 and for Wales in 2011.3 Since these bodies do not share 
Westminster’s sovereignty, they are susceptible to judicial review on the ground 
that they have strayed beyond their legislative competence as defined in their 
parent statutes, and potentially – in extreme circumstances – also at common law.4 
 Judicial review of a subordinate legislature is not unprecedented in the UK 
context. Review had been possible of legislation enacted by the former Parliament 
of Northern Ireland, established under the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which 
existed from 1922 until 1972. However, resort to the courts was relatively 
uncommon – a fact attributed inter alia to the absence of a constitutional tradition 
of legislative review5 – and there was only one successful challenge in the 
Parliament’s 50-year history.6 By contrast, judicial control has proved to be a far 
more important feature of the contemporary devolution settlements, both in terms 
of their institutional design and their practical operation. For instance, provisions 
in Acts of the Scottish Parliament (ASPs) have been declared ultra vires on five 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, University of Strathclyde. 
** Professor of Public Law, University of Strathclyde. 
*** Lecturer in Law, University of Glasgow. 
1 See, eg, Mark Elliott, ‘Legislative Supremacy in a Multi-Dimensional Constitution’, in Mark Elliott and 
David Feldman (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Public Law (CUP, 2015); for a defence of the traditional 
understanding, see Richard Ekins, ‘Legislative Freedom in the United Kingdom’ (2017) 133 LQR 582. 
2 Scotland Act 1998; Northern Ireland Act 1998. 
3 The Welsh Assembly was also established in 1999, by the Government of Wales Act 1998, but only gained 
primary legislative powers in 2011 following a referendum held under the terms of the Government of Wales 
Act 2006. 
4 AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46. 
5 See James Mitchell, Devolution in the UK (Manchester University Press, 2009) 74 – 75.  
6 Ulster Transport Authority v James Brown & Sons Ltd [1953] NI 79. Calvert notes that there were other 
examples of persuasive criticisms being made of the validity of Northern Irish legislation, which on at 
least one occasion led to legislative correction – Harry Calvert, Constitutional Law in Northern Ireland: a Study 
in Regional Government (Stevens & Sons Ltd/Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 1968) 289.  
occasions so far,7 whilst Welsh Assembly measures have been successfully 
challenged once8 (although there have as yet been no challenges at all – successful 
or otherwise – to devolved primary legislation in Northern Ireland). 
 In this article, we explore the role and significance of constitutional review 
in the devolved context, focusing on the experience in Scotland. We discuss, first, 
the model of constitutional review put in place by the Scotland Act 1998; second, we 
explore the operation of these constraints in practice; and, third, we consider the 
developing devolution jurisprudence. In so doing, we identify a key tension in 
understanding the constitutional implications of the role of the courts in relation to 
the devolved legislatures. Is it, on the one hand, to be understood as a marker of 
the subordinate status of the devolved legislatures – which therefore serves to 
bolster the constitutional status of the UK Parliament by the fact of its freedom 
from corresponding constraints? Or is it, alternatively, a manifestation of a ‘new 
constitutionalism’, by which the Scottish Parliament has, in the words of Lord 
Rodger in Whaley v Lord Watson of Invergowrie, ‘joined that wider family of 
Parliaments’ which ‘owe their existence and powers to statute and are in various 
ways subject to the law and to the courts which act to uphold the law’9; a feature 
which underlines the unusual constitutional status of the UK Parliament,10 and 
which may therefore be important a step on the road towards a more general 
acceptance of the legitimacy of constitutional review in the UK context? 
II   CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE SCOTLAND ACT 1998 
 The legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament is set out primarily in 
sections 28 and 29 of the Scotland Act 1998. The Act adopts a ‘reserved powers’ 
model of legislative competence whereby the Parliament is given plenary power to 
make laws by section 28(1), but these are subject to specific limits set out in section 
29. The most important restrictions contained in section 2911 are of two main 
types. First, there are what might be termed ‘federal’ restrictions; in other words, 
those which define the division of competences between the UK and Scottish 
levels of government. Thus, the Parliament may not make laws which ‘relate to’ the 
list of policy areas reserved to the UK Parliament set out in Schedule 5 to the Act 
                                                          
7 Cameron v Cottam 2013 JC 12; Salvesen v Riddell 2013 SC (UKSC) 236; Christian Institute v Lord Advocate 
2017 SC (UKSC) 29; P v Scottish Ministers 2017 SLT 271; AB v HMA 2017 SLT 401. 
8 Re Recovery of Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill [2015] AC 1016. 
9 2000 SC 340, 349. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The Parliament is also prohibited from legislating extra-territorially (s 29)(2)(a)), or from removing the 
Lord Advocate from his position as head of the systems of criminal prosecution and investigation of 
deaths in Scotland (s 29(2)(e)). 
(as subsequently amended).12 In addition, it may not modify specific statutes listed 
in Schedule 4 (including some, but not all, of the provisions of the Scotland Act 
itself) nor modify the ‘law on reserved matters’13 (a distinct restriction from 
reserved policy areas),14 except insofar as this occurs as part of a modification of 
the general rules of Scots private or criminal law which govern reserved and 
devolved matters alike.15 Secondly, there are ‘constitutional’ restrictions. These are 
cross-cutting constraints applicable to legislation otherwise within devolved 
competence which seek to protect other important constitutional values, namely 
that ASPs must not be incompatible with rights contained in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘Convention rights’) or (for the time being) with 
European Union (EU) law.16 To these express statutory restrictions, we must now 
add the further common law constraint that (as discussed further below) the 
Parliament must not legislate in a way which would breach the Rule of Law.17 
 As this last point suggests, one way in which these competence constraints 
may be enforced is via the ordinary supervisory jurisdiction of the courts at 
common law. But the 1998 Act itself also contains a range of mechanisms – both 
political and judicial – designed to ensure that the Parliament remains within 
competence. The political controls include requirements on the minister or other 
member introducing a Bill to state that its provisions are intra vires, as well as an 
independent requirement on the Parliament’s Presiding Officer to state her 
opinion as to the competence of the Bill,18 and a veto power for UK ministers for 
use in situations where they reasonably believe that a Bill is incompatible with 
international obligations or the interests of defence or national security, or that it 
modifies the law on reserved matters in a manner which would have an adverse 
effect on the operation of that law.19 The judicial controls include a power for UK 
or Scottish Government law officers to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court for a 
ruling as to its competence in the four week period between the passing of the Bill 
by the Parliament and its submission for Royal Assent.20 In addition, Schedule 6 
empowers the Law Officers to initiate post-enactment competence challenges, and 
regulates the handling of so-called ‘devolution issues’ which arise in other 
proceedings, including provision for notification of the law officers, and reference 
                                                          
12 S 29(2)(b). 
13 S 29(2)(c). 
14 See Christian Institute, above n 7, at para 63. 
15 Sch 4, para 2. See Martin v HM Advocate 2010 SC (UKSC) 40; Henderson v HM Advocate 2011 JC 96. 
16 S 29(2)(d). Legislation on certain protected subject matters are now also subject to a procedural 
constraint whereby they require to be passed by a two-thirds majority –Scotland Act 1998 s31A. 
17 AXA General Insurance Ltd, above n 4. 
18 Scotland Act 1998 s 31. 
19 Scotland Act 1998 s 35. 
20 Scotland Act 1998 ss 32A and 33. 
to higher courts. A separate procedure, introduced by the Scotland Act 2012, 
regulates so-called ‘compatibility issues’, which are questions arising in criminal 
proceedings, inter alia, as to whether an ASP is compatible with Convention rights 
or EU law. Finally, the 1998 Act makes provision for interpretation of ASPs, 
instructing judges to read legislation ‘as narrowly as is required for it to be within 
competence, if such a reading is possible’,21 and for remedies in the event of a 
finding that legislation is outwith competence.22 
 Three features of the system of constitutional review created by the 
Scotland Act are particularly noteworthy. The first is that it is, in comparative 
terms, a very expansive one. Provision is made for both pre-legislative and post-
legislative challenge to the vires of legislation. Statutes can be attacked both 
directly, in proceedings raised specifically for that purpose, or collaterally in the 
course of other proceedings. In other words, both abstract and concrete review is 
permitted. In addition to the express provision for institutional challenge by the 
law officers made by the Scotland Act, any party with ‘sufficient interest in the 
subject matter of the application’ can raise judicial review proceedings at common 
law,23 which is now interpreted widely to permit public interest as well as individual 
challenges.24 And there are no specific time limits for the raising of a devolution or 
compatibility issue; provided that the proceedings in which the issue is raised are 
not themselves time-barred, the vires of an ASP could potentially be questioned 
many years after the legislation was enacted. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, the extent of the judicial control over the decisions of 
a democratic legislature to which this model potentially gives rise – the prospect, as 
one early commentator put it, for the creation of ‘un gouvernement des juges’,25 with 
extensive freedom to interpret necessarily broad constitutional limits on the 
powers of the Scottish Parliament – was not controversial at the time the Scotland 
Act was enacted. This contrasts starkly with attitudes during earlier, abortive 
attempts at creating devolved assemblies for Scotland and Wales during the 1970s.  
As Tam Dalyell MP explained during the Commons Second Reading debate on the 
Scotland Bill:26  
Who is to decide whether the Scottish Assembly has overstepped its powers? During the 1974-77 
saga, that was a matter of hot debate within the Government, centring around the issue of 
judicial review. One school held, virtually as a matter of basic legal and constitutional principle, 
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23 Court of Session Act 1988 s 27B(2)(a). 
24 AXA General Insurance Ltd, above n 4; Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44. 
25 Aidan O’Neill, ‘The Scotland Act and the Government of Judges’ 1999 SLT (News) 61. 
26 HC Deb Vol 304, col 88, 12 January 1998. 
that it would be wrong to deny citizens the right to argue in the courts that an assembly Act that 
disadvantaged them exceeded the powers granted by Westminster in the devolution statute. The 
other school held … that it would be unreasonable in practice, for lack-of-certainty reasons, and 
politically objectionable to Scotland that the primary legislation of the Assembly should be liable 
at any time--perhaps, long after enactment--to be struck down by the courts as ultra vires. The 
more broadly drawn the delineation, the greater--so that school argued--the risks. 
 Mitchell cites the minute of a meeting in October 1974 of Whitehall 
Permanent Secretaries convened to discuss the issue of devolution. The 
participants ‘noted that little thought had been given to resolving constitutional 
disputes but rejected a “constitutional tribunal such as the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council” as “entirely contrary to the spirit of devolution within a unitary 
state with one sovereign Parliament.” This, they maintained, “should not be 
contemplated.”’27 
 What had changed by 1998? Dalyell points to the impact of EU law as 
having meant that ‘public opinion has become more accustomed to the idea that 
the legal system might indeed be able to overrule democratically enacted statute.’28 
But also significant is the origins of the 1998 Act in the work of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention.29 This body had begun life by endorsing the 1988 
Claim of Right for Scotland, which proclaimed the sovereignty of the Scottish 
people over the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, and asserted the need 
for a system of checks and balances rather than concentration of power. Thus the 
Convention rooted its proposals for a Scottish Parliament in a claimed ‘historical 
and historic Scottish constitutional principle that power is limited, should be 
dispersed and is derived from the people.’30 By the time the Scotland Bill was 
enacted, therefore, the principle that disputes over legislative competence should 
be subject to judicial resolution was no longer controversial.31 As will be discussed 
further below, the only issue subject to serious debate was the identity of the court 
to which final appeal on devolution issues would lie.   
 The second important feature of constitutional review in the devolution 
context is its asymmetry. The hard legal limits on the competence of the Scottish 
Parliament are not mirrored by equivalent limits on the UK Parliament. As far as 
the federal constraints are concerned, the power of the UK Parliament to legislate 
for Scotland in devolved matters is expressly preserved by section 28(7) of the 
                                                          
27 Mitchell, above n 5, 120 – 121. 
28 Above n 26. 
29 See Jean McFadden, ‘The Scottish Constitutional Convention’ [1995] PL 215. 
30 Scottish Constitutional Convention, Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right (1995) 10. 
31 The case for judicial resolution had been set out in detail prior to the 1997 election by Colin Boyd QC, 
who subsequently became Solicitor General for Scotland: ‘Parliaments and Courts: Powers and Dispute 
Resolution’, in St John Bates (ed), Devolution to Scotland: the Legal Aspects (T & T Clark, 1997). 
Scotland Act 1998. Its exercise is subject only to political constraint in the form of 
the so-called Sewel Convention, which states that the UK Parliament will not 
normally legislate in respect of devolved matters without the consent of the 
Scottish Parliament. Notwithstanding the statutory ‘recognition’ of the convention 
by section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016, the Supreme Court in R (Miller) v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union32 held that it remains a convention rather than a 
binding legal rule, and that the courts therefore have no role to play in either 
interpreting or enforcing its requirements.33 
 As regards the constitutional constraints, Convention rights bear more 
heavily on the Scottish Parliament than on the UK Parliament. Whereas an ASP 
which is incompatible with Convention rights is ‘not law’, in relation to UK 
statutes the courts are merely empowered to issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’, 
which does not invalidate the legislation.34 Only the EU law constraint operates 
more or less symmetrically, insofar as the courts may ‘disapply’ an Act of the UK 
Parliament which is contrary to EU law,35 though even here there is a theoretical 
difference since there is judicial authority stating that the courts would give effect 
to an Act of the UK Parliament which expressly contradicted EU law.36 More 
significantly, if the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is enacted in its current 
form, the devolved legislatures will continue to be bound by ‘retained EU law’ 
even after the UK leaves the EU, while the UK Parliament will become free to 
amend it as it pleases. 
 From one perspective, this asymmetry is unremarkable; it merely marks the 
important constitutional distinction between a scheme of devolution and one of 
federalism, thereby underlining the subordinate status of the devolved legislatures. 
However, the justification for asymmetry is less obvious in relation to the cross-
cutting constraints, especially Convention rights.  Here the case can be made in 
principle that it is the democratic nature of a legislative body that entitles it, rather 
than the courts, to the last word on questions of rights protection within its sphere 
of competence, and not merely the ‘technicality’ of parliamentary sovereignty 
which uniquely entitles the Westminster Parliament to judicial deference.37 The 
anomaly is underlined by the fact that the Scottish Ministers are also more tightly 
                                                          
32 [2017] UKSC 5. 
33 This does not mean that it might not be given some legal force, for instance as an aid to interpreting 
the intention of Parliament in circumstances where it is unclear whether or not it intends to legislate for 
Scotland on a devolved matter. 
34 Human Rights Act 1998 s 4. 
35 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. 
36 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151.  
37 See Chris Himsworth, ‘Rights versus Devolution’, in Tom Campbell, KD Ewing and Adam Tomkins 
(eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP, 2001). 
bound by Convention rights than their UK counterparts in that they cannot act 
incompatibly with Convention rights even if acting under a UK statute which 
authorises the incompatibility.38 In relation to EU law, similarly, it may be argued 
that the refusal to lift the competence constraint on the devolved institutions post-
Brexit evinces a lack of trust and a pulling of constitutional rank by Westminster, 
which is difficult to justify as a matter of constitutional principle.   
 The final notable feature of the devolution model of constitutional review is 
the role of the UK Supreme Court as the final arbiter of devolution issues. As 
originally enacted, the final appeal court for devolution disputes was the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). The JCPC was chosen for a number of 
reasons: it had played this role under the Government of Ireland Act 1920; it had 
experience of constitutional adjudication in relation to Commonwealth 
jurisdictions; and above all it avoided the perception – had the House of Lords 
been chosen as the apex court – of the UK Parliament sitting in judgment on 
disputes to which it was a party. Nevertheless, amendments were tabled both by 
the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the House of Commons39 and by the Liberal 
Democrats in the House of Lords,40 to replace the JCPC with a specially-
constituted constitutional court. For the SNP, the main objection was to the 
composition of the JCPC, particularly its dominance by English-trained judges. For 
the Liberal Democrats, the primary concern was the JCPC’s lack of institutional 
independence.   
 The latter issue was resolved in 2009, with the establishment of the Supreme 
Court41 and the transfer to it of the JCPC’s devolution jurisdiction (a reform which 
also resolved the practical problem created by the existence of two ‘apex courts’ 
which were sometimes asked to resolve the same legal issues by different 
procedural routes). However, the creation of the Supreme Court revived the SNP’s 
objection to an English-dominated court having the last word on matters relating 
to Scots law. In fact, it commissioned a review of the possibilities for ‘repatriating’ 
final appeals in Scots cases to an Edinburgh-based court, although the resulting 
report concluded that this would be constitutionally inappropriate while Scotland 
remained part of the United Kingdom.42 Of particular sensitivity, though, was the 
question of final appeals in criminal cases. The Scotland Act 1998 had inadvertently 
created a right of appeal in criminal cases from the High Court of Justiciary to the 
                                                          
38 Scotland Act 1998 s 57(2). 
39 See HC Deb Vol 312, cols 203 - 215, 12 May 1998.  
40 See HL Deb Vol 593, cols 1963 – 1986, 18 October 1998. 
41 Under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 Pt 3. 
42 Neil Walker, Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal System (Scottish Government, 2010) 
<http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/299388/0093334.pdf>. 
JCPC/Supreme Court, where none had previously existed, because of the inclusion 
of the Lord Advocate (head of the Scottish criminal prosecution system) within the 
definition of the Scottish Ministers, and hence the subjection of prosecution 
decisions to devolution constraints. Following controversy about the operation of 
this appeal process amongst Scottish judges, and well-publicised objections by the 
then Scottish First Minister and Justice Secretary to the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Cadder v HM Advocate43 and Fraser v HM Advocate,44 the separate compatibility 
issues procedure was created for criminal cases, which limits the role of the 
Supreme Court to the determination of the compatibility issues and requires the 
case to be referred back to the High Court of Justiciary (HCJ) for final disposal.45 
 In determining devolution or compatibility issues, the Supreme Court is – 
uniquely – sitting as a UK court, rather than a Scottish (or English and Welsh, or 
Northern Irish) one as it does in all other cases.46 In other words, determination of 
the limits of the Scottish Parliament’s legislative competence is conceived of as a 
matter of UK constitutional law, rather than a matter of Scots law. Again, from one 
perspective, it is unremarkable that the establishment of institutions for self-rule 
through devolution should be balanced by the creation of a mechanism for 
asserting a common understanding of the limits to that self-rule. Nevertheless, the 
role of the Supreme Court remains contestable for two reasons. One is that 
differently-situated judges might have different understandings of the nature of the 
evolving constitutional order and of the place of the Scottish Parliament within it – 
something that is potentially problematic given the political understanding of the 
origins of devolution as an expression of a peculiarly Scottish constitutional 
tradition at odds with the dominant UK tradition. Secondly, as will be discussed 
further below, the idea of a common devolution jurisdiction is problematic given 
the diversity of the devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
themselves. And even in the application of the common external constraints of 
Convention rights and EU law, there is room for greater recognition of internal 
diversity that the unifying role of the Supreme Court may permit.47 
III   JUDICIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
A   Judicial Constitutional Review 
                                                          
43 [2010] UKSC 43. 
44 [2011] UKSC 24. 
45 See Aileen McHarg, ‘Final Appeals in Scots Criminal Cases’, UK Const Law Blog, 4 October 2011; 
Chris Himsworth and Christine O’Neill, Scotland’s Constitution: Law and Practice (Bloomsbury, 3rd edn, 2015) 
para 14.20. 
46 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 s 41(2). 
47 See David Feldman, ‘None, One or Several: Perspectives on the UK’s Constitution(s)’ (2005) 64 CLJ 
329. 
 At the outset of the devolution project there was a certain expectation that 
the courts would regularly be called upon, whether by UK and/or Scottish 
Government Law Officers referring Bills to the Supreme Court during the 
statutory pre-enactment period48 or in post-enactment challenges raised by private 
parties, to exercise their new powers of constitutional review. Whilst for some this 
was an aspiration – to be a model for democracy, according to Crick and Millar ‘[a 
new] Scottish Parliament…needs [to be limited by law] as much as any other’49 – 
for others the possibility was more problematic. As Aidan O’Neill had warned, by 
being ‘dragged into the political arena’ in order to police constitutional boundaries 
the integrity of the judges themselves was at stake: the danger being that their 
decisions would not be portrayed as ‘upholding individual rights but as the 
thwarting of the democratic will’ as expressed through the acts of new legislature 
and executive.50 However, the experience to date has been quite different.  
 Contrary to the expectation that the Scottish Parliament would be of a 
different nature to Westminster’s ‘legislative sausage factory’51 the devolved 
Parliament has been something of a hyper-active legislature, having passed 264 
ASPs (an average of 15 per annum) since its first - the Mental Health (Public Safety 
and Appeals) (Scotland) Act - in 1999.52 Notwithstanding the volume of legislation, 
however, no Bills have been referred by the Law Officers to the Supreme Court53 
and there have been relatively few post-enactment challenges raised by private 
parties. Of the latter, just 18 ASPs have been subject to judicial review (albeit some 
more than once).54 Incompatibility with Convention rights has been the dominant 
ground of challenge, with just three cases invoking the reserved/devolved 
boundary and three arguing for an incompatibility with EU law. Of the 18 ASPs 
that have been challenged five have been held to have fallen foul of section 29. All 
five have succeeded on Convention rights grounds, albeit in Christian Institute there 
was a parallel incompatibility as between article 8 ECHR and equivalent provisions 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.55 The residual Rule of Law ground set 
out in AXA has not been a significant feature of devolution litigation, receiving 
                                                          
48 Scotland Act 1998 s 33. 
49 Bernard Crick and David Millar, To Make the Parliament of Scotland a Model for Democracy (John Wheatley 
Centre, 1995) 9. 
50 Above n 25, 66.  
51 Alan Page, Constitutional Law of Scotland (W Green, 2015) 201. 
52 This Act was itself the subject of an unsuccessful challenge in Anderson v Scottish Ministers 2002 SC (PC) 
63. 
53 By way of contrast, in Wales two Bills have been referred to the Supreme Court by the Attorney 
General (the legality of each being upheld) and one, which was struck down, has been referred by the 
Counsel General for Wales. 
54 The Tobacco and Primary Medical Services (Scotland) Act 2010 was challenged separately on reserved matters 
grounds by Imperial Tobacco ([2012] UKSC 61]) and on EU law grounds by a subsidiary, Sinclair Collis 
([2012] CSIH 80). 
55 Christian Institute, above n 7, paras 102-105. 
sustained attention only once, in an unsuccessful challenge to the exclusion of 
prisoners from the right to vote in the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 
2013.56 Given the high threshold for judicial intervention on this ground, this is 
unsurprising. In this case, however, the Supreme Court did illustrate the sort of 
(unlikely) situation to which this ground might apply: whilst the common law could 
not be used to extend the franchise beyond the limits set by the legislature, the 
Supreme Court – ‘informed by principles of democracy and the rule of law and 
international norms’ – would declare legislation to be unlawful which sought to 
‘entrench [the executive] power by curtailment of the franchise or similar device’.57      
 Of the five cases to date in which legislation has been held ‘not [to be] law’ 
it is notable that each has related to specific provisions within the statutory scheme 
rather than to the statute or to the overall policy objective in its entirety. This being 
so the Supreme Court has so far adopted something of a ‘dialogic’ remedial 
approach as opposed to a rigid and final strike down. In two of the three civil 
challenges that were successful – Salvesen and Christian Institute – the Supreme Court 
exercised its discretion under section 102(2)(b) of the Scotland Act 1998 to suspend 
the effect of its decisions that section 72(10) of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) 
Act 2003 and the information sharing provisions of Part 4 of the Children and Young 
People (Scotland) Act 2004 respectively were incompatible with Convention rights. 
This, the Court said, would allow an opportunity for the Scottish Parliament and 
the Scottish Ministers (if they so decide) to take measures in order to remedy the 
identified incompatibilities.58 The dialogic nature of this remedy was underlined in 
Christian Institute in which, although the Court felt it ‘inappropriate to propose 
particular legislative solutions’,59 it nevertheless took the opportunity to warn the 
executive and legislature that minimal amendments that failed to address the 
complexity of the breach would run the risk of further judicial sanction.60 The 
third, P v Scottish Ministers, was a decision by the Outer House which at the time of 
writing had been put out to order pending submissions on the use of the court’s 
remedial powers.61 In the remaining two successful cases - Cameron and AB, each 
of which raised ‘compatibility issues’ relating to criminal procedure in Scotland – 
the decisions that section 58 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 
and section 39(2)(a)(i) of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 respectively were 
‘not law’ were returned to the HCJ for that court to determine whether or not to 
suspend or to vary the effects of the resulting invalidity.  
                                                          
56 Moohan v Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67. 
57 Ibid para 35.  
58 Salvesen, above n 7, para 57. 
59 Christian Institute, above n 7, para 107. 
60 Ibid. 
61 P, above n 7, para 65. 
 In Martin, Lord Hope expressed a degree of surprise that – in light of the 
complex and multi-layered boundaries to legislative competence – there had been 
so few challenges to the validity of ASPs, and noted as ‘remarkable’ the fact that 
those challenges had mostly been confined to Convention rights grounds.62 
Though the reserved matters model adopted in the Scotland Act 1998 might not be 
‘a model of clarity’ he thought it striking that it had so far achieved the aim of 
maximum stability. To this stability Lord Hope attributed harmony between the 
UK (Labour majority) and Scottish (Labour-led coalition) governments until the 
SNP formed a minority government in May 2007.63 However, it is a significant 
feature of the SNP minority (2007-2011 and 2016-present) and majority (2011-
2016) governments that political disharmony as between the Scottish and UK 
Governments since 2007 has not manifested in overt attempts by the former 
unilaterally to push the limits of devolved competence and to make political capital 
out of even adverse judgments about competence by the UK Supreme Court. 
Instead the close attention that is paid to the reserved/devolved boundary during 
the process of parliamentary review – in particular in the dialogue between the UK 
and Scottish Governments that precedes the Advocate General’s decision to make 
a reference to the Supreme Court - as well as politicians’ and officials’ instincts for 
what sits within the sphere of devolved competence and a genuinely-held 
commitment on both sides to government according to the rule of law - seems to 
have policed the reserved/devolved boundary effectively (at least in the sense of 
producing legislation that has so far avoided judicial censure).64 To the reasons for 
the surprisingly few cases raised on reserved matters grounds we might add the 
willingness on both sides to utilise the flexibility inherent in the devolution 
settlement to supply omissions in legislative competence where there is a degree of 
policy convergence through the transfer of competence65 or by the UK Parliament 
legislating with devolved consent in reserved areas that overlap with Scottish 
Government policy. We might attribute the greater frequency of - and the more 
successful recourse to - Convention rights grounds to the simultaneously more 
obvious and yet more vague nature of the ECHR boundary. On the one hand 
Convention rights issues are more readily identifiable – both by lawyers and by 
those who are potentially affected by legislative or executive action - than are issues 
arising from the nuances of schedules 4 and 5, with a vast body of ECHR 
grounded case law (both at Strasbourg and in the domestic courts) to draw upon. 
                                                          
62 Martin, above n 15, para 4. 
63 Ibid. 
64 For more detailed analysis of the vetting process see Bruce Adamson, ‘The Protection of Human 
Rights in the Legislative Process in Scotland’ in Murray Hunt et al (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: 
Redressing the Democratic Deficit’ (Hart, 2015) ch 13, and Christopher McCorkindale and Janet L Hiebert, 
‘Vetting Bills in the Scottish Parliament for Legislative Competence’ (2017) 21(3) Edin LR 319.  
65 This might happen by Order-in-Council under section 33 of the Scotland Act 1998 or by way of primary 
legislation by the UK Parliament. 
On the other hand, it may be more difficult for legislators and officials correctly to 
anticipate how courts might apply abstract Convention rights to particular 
statutory provisions in the absence of directly analogous cases. 
 If the fear was that the judiciary would regularly be called upon to (and 
would often) exercise strong powers of judicial review in relation to ASPs, this has 
not yet materialised. Indeed, Page has argued that it is not judicial activism but 
judicial inactivity that has defined the experience so far: that ‘conscious of the more 
exposed position in which they find themselves as a result of devolution’ the 
judiciary have been – and might continue to be - wary of wielding those powers, 
with ‘bleak’ consequences for the aspiration of a legislature and government 
limited by law.66 However, even if its use (for better or for worse) has been 
infrequent there is no doubt that the presence of what has been described by Lord 
Neuberger to be in effect a constitutional court in the devolved context67 - to which 
the final word as to the legality of legislation has been vested - has significantly 
impacted upon the devolution landscape.  
 First, there is an opportunity for those with significant commercial interests 
at stake - and deep resources to draw upon - to (ab)use the legal process in order to 
delay for three to five years the implementation of legislation for short term, private 
gain. Even if ultimately their challenges were unsuccessful in the Supreme Court, 
the opportunity for AXA General Insurance to delay the implementation of 
legislation requiring them to make payments to the victims of asbestos exposure 
(with the hope of having to make fewer payments to still surviving victims at a 
later date of implementation), or the opportunity for Imperial Tobacco68 or the 
Scotch Whisky Association69 to delay the implementation of legislation with a likely 
negative impact upon the sale of tobacco or alcohol products (weighing income 
from sales during the period of the challenge against the cost of legal fees), 
illustrates the way in which judicially-enforceable limits on legislatures can be used 
strategically to subvert democratic institutions even where the judicial power to 
strike down legislation is wielded only sparingly. It is, in other words, the existence as 
well as the exercise of judicial power that proves problematic. Second, whilst 
remedial discretion in the event of a successful challenge returns the issue to be 
resolved by the democratically elected parliament or government, the courts wield 
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a significant power therein actively to shape that resolution (as in Christian Institute 
by making a bold assertion of what would not be acceptable). Moreover, for those 
affected by ultra vires legislation a decision, for example, to limit the retrospective 
effect of the judgment (as in Cameron where the effect of the decision was limited 
only to ‘live’ cases) may have perverse effects for individuals who have in the past 
suffered from a resulting harm.70 Third, the devolution jurisprudence (actual or 
anticipated) of the Supreme Court drives the assessments of legislative competence 
that are made at the sections 31 and 33 checkpoints during the parliamentary process 
of constitutional review, washing judicial norms through the political process.         
B   Parliamentary Constitutional Review 
 In recent years public law scholarship has sought to describe, and to defend, 
an alternative or ‘third way’ of constitutionalism. This approach builds upon 
(rather than breaks with) antecedent models of legislative or judicial supremacy in 
which either the parliament or the courts have the last word on the legality of 
legislation.71 Two characteristics distinguish this approach. One is constrained 
judicial remedial powers. For Westminster-based parliamentary systems, the idea of 
introducing a judicially-enforceable bill of rights represents a fundamental 
departure from previously held assumptions about the core constitutional principle 
of parliamentary supremacy. However, by distinguishing between judicial review and 
judicial remedies, it is possible to retain the legislature’s last word on the validity of 
legislation. The second fundamental characteristic is that this approach envisages a 
far more important role for rights review at the legislative stage than is usually 
associated with a bill of rights. By placing a statutory obligation on the executive to 
report to parliament when a Bill is inconsistent with rights this particular focus 
reflects the following ideals:72 first, identifying whether and how proposed 
legislation implicates rights; second, encouraging more rights-compliant ways of 
achieving legislative objectives (and in the extreme discourage the pursuit of 
objectives that are fundamentally incompatible with rights); third, facilitating 
parliamentary deliberation about whether legislation implicates rights, thereby 
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increasing parliament’s capacity to pressure government to justify, alter or abandon 
legislation that unduly infringes rights.73  
 Whilst the Scotland Act model departs from this ‘third way’ by reserving to 
the judiciary the last word on the legality of ASPs, the statutory reporting 
requirement set out in sections 31 and 33 expand the traditional scope of 
parliamentary review in two ways. First, by requiring not only the responsible 
person (typically, the responsible Minister) but, in addition, the Parliament’s 
Presiding Officer to report to the legislature on the question of competence, and 
by permitting the Scottish and UK Government Law Officers to refer a Bill directly 
to the Supreme Court where concerns persist, the Scotland Act requires a far more 
expansive range of assessments of competence that combine so as to create 
stronger incentives than exist in other jurisdictions for the executive to revisit 
opinions of competence or to make amendments in order to secure a safe passage 
for its legislation. Second, the devolution model expands the range of 
constitutional boundaries against which these assessments must be made. Not just 
rights review, the Scotland Act requires parliamentary constitutional review in a 
broader sense, taking account of the territorial division of power between the UK 
and the devolved institutions as well as the rights and obligations that flow from 
membership of the European Union. Taken together, the aims of this form of 
review are two-fold. Internally, it serves to ensure that at each of the relevant 
check-points a proper and informed assessment has been made about 
competence.74 It should, in other words, be extremely difficult for the Scottish 
Government (knowingly or otherwise) to introduce, and for the Scottish 
Parliament to pass, legislation that is outwith competence. Externally, it serves to 
aid the Scottish Parliament in the exercise of its scrutiny function by informing 
Parliament so that – as the Bill makes its way through the chamber - its members 
may ‘ask questions about [those assessments], raise queries as to whether [they are] 
entirely correct, and no doubt identify particular provisions in the Bill where there 
may or may not be some doubt as to whether the provisions lie within the 
legislative competence.’75 Constitutional review, in other words, ought in the first 
instance to be a political exercise conducted during the legislative process and in 
relation to all Bills rather than a judicial examination of the relatively few pieces of 
legislation that are brought to the attention of the senior courts. 
 The experience of judicial review outlined above points to the relative 
effectiveness of these checks in achieving the first aim: the protection of legislation 
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against judicial censure. However, the second aspiration – informing the legislature 
so that it might be aware of and engage with competence concerns during the 
legislative process – has not yet been met. Despite there being serious 
disagreement between the Scottish Government and the Presiding Officer and/or 
Law Officers as to the legislative competence of a Bill once or twice in a typical 
year76 there have been no instances of the Presiding Officer disclosing the existence 
or the nature of any disagreement to the Parliament upon introduction, and 
disagreement between the Scottish and UK Government has not yet manifested in 
the reference of a Bill by the Advocate General to the Supreme Court during the 
four week pre-enactment period.77 Instead these disagreements are resolved in a 
series of iterative processes that take place mostly between officials during the policy 
formulation stage (between the Scottish Government Legal Directorate (SGLD) 
and the Lord Advocate) and in the pre-introduction period (between the Scottish 
Government and (separately) both the Solicitor to the Scottish Parliament, on 
behalf of the Presiding Officer, and the Office of the Advocate General (OAG) on 
behalf of the UK Government). During these processes the key question for each of 
the relevant actors is: ‘how would the Supreme Court be likely to decide’ in the 
event of a judicial challenge. For the Scottish Government, the key decision is 
whether to amend legislation before it is introduced into the Parliament in order to 
address concerns expressed by the Lord Advocate, the Presiding Officer or by 
OAG that the Supreme Court would be likely to strike down the legislation (or 
provisions therein) in its existing form, or whether to continue with its view that 
the legislation is likely to be saved by the Court. In the case of close calls the 
benefit of the doubt will normally be given to the Scottish Government’s view 
where it is reasonably arguable that legislation (or powers conferred therein) would 
be more likely than not to survive judicial censure.78    
 A holistic analysis of these processes is beyond the scope of this article.79 
For present purposes we need only stress two important ways in which the 
possibility of judicial constitutional review influences this process. First, because the 
ultimate sanction is judicial strike down the question of competence is seen as a 
legal question that is best addressed by legal advisors reflecting upon the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, rather than by political actors. On the 
question of competence Ministers will defer entirely to the view of the Lord 
Advocate whilst the Presiding Officer – a Member of the Scottish Parliament 
(MSP) typically with no legal background - will lean heavily on the advice offered 
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by the Solicitor to the Scottish Parliament. Moreover, MSPs in plenary or in 
committee will defer to the view of the Presiding Officer that a Bill is within 
competence rather than look behind that statement to determine whether there 
persists a reasonable (but undisclosed) doubt that should be examined further 
during the legislative process. The legal nature of the exercise in other words 
undermines the aim of informed parliamentary review behind the process’s ‘efficient 
secret’: the more impactful exercise of bureaucratic review by officials before the Bill is 
introduced into Parliament. Second, because the test is conceived of in legal terms 
the aspiration to think politically about legislative competence risks giving way to an 
assessment of the bare minimum protection required by law. So, the exclusion of 
prisoners from the franchise in the 2014 independence referendum seemed to 
proceed not from a principled position on the merits or not of allowing (to some) 
prisoners the right to vote in a referendum of such constitutional significance but 
instead to a narrow reading of the scope of the right to vote.80  
IV    DEVOLUTION JURISPRUDENCE    
 This third section draws out certain of the themes of the case law in which 
the devolution settlement has been considered. It works outwards from the 
question which most neatly captures the tension, already identified, between two 
understandings of the judicial role within that settlement: on one hand, the notion 
that the courts' role thereunder is a marker of the subordinate status of the 
devolved institutions and, on the other, the claim that their new functions have in 
fact an inescapably constitutional essence, with implications beyond the devolution 
context. That question is the status of the devolution statutes, and - in turn - the 
approach that is to be taken to their interpretation. 
A   Review of the Scotland Act 1998 
 With regard to the interpretation of the devolution statutes themselves we 
might usefully distinguish between two levels of judicial power: the first order 
power of interpretation and the second-order power to choose which approach is 
to be taken to the task. In the early case law the status of the Parliament was 
contested. Lord Rodger, then in the Inner House, noted in Whaley that the court at 
first instance had given ‘insufficient weight to the fundamental character of the 
Parliament as a body which — however important its role — has been created by 
statute and derives its powers from statute’ and which must therefore (and ‘like any 
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other statutory body’) ‘work within the scope of those powers’.81 However, the 
question of the status of the Parliament does not itself determine the status (and 
correct approach to the interpretation) of the instrument which created it, and 
these questions persisted even after the status of the devolved legislature was 
settled, prompted most clearly by attempts to employ certain dicta of the House of 
Lords in the Northern Irish case of Robinson in order to argue that the devolution 
statutes (as the House of Lords had said of the Northern Ireland Act 1998) were ‘in 
effect’ constitutions, and so were to be interpreted ‘generously and purposively’.82  
 The alleged implication of these remarks – that an approach be taken to 
interpretation that was special to the devolution statutes and which would in effect 
give the benefit of the doubt to the Parliament in deciding whether or not ASPs 
were within competence – was consistently rejected in later cases. In Imperial 
Tobacco, Lord Hope stated that ‘the description of the Act as a constitutional statute 
cannot be taken, in itself, to be a guide to its interpretation’;83 instead, the rules in 
the 1998 Act ‘must be interpreted in the same way as any other rules that are found 
in a UK statute’. Though the system it created must ‘be taken to have been 
intended to create a system for the exercise of legislative power by the Scottish 
Parliament that was coherent, stable and workable’, that factor was not unique to 
it, but was common to all statutes.84 ‘The best way of ensuring that a coherent, 
stable and workable outcome is achieved’, Lord Hope continued, ‘is to adopt an 
approach to the meaning of a statute that is constant and predictable’, an end 
achieved by constituting the statute ‘according to the ordinary meaning of the 
words used.’85 The approach ultimately taken therefore amounts in the first place 
to a multiple renunciation of judicial power: first, the power to depart from the 
ordinary meaning of words; second, the power to infer the purpose of the 
devolution statutes and to use it to place on the language therein a construction 
which the ordinary meaning of the words may not be capable of bearing. It 
remains the case, however, that this renunciation of a first order judicial power is 
itself an exercise of the second order power identified above, where – albeit within 
important limits – judges can and do decide what they get to decide. The courts 
have been willing to acknowledge the constitutional status of the Scotland Acts 
when little or nothing is at stake in doing so, but have been mostly unwilling to 
accept that the fact of devolution effected any constitutional change beyond what 
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is immediately apparent from the terms of those statutes and their counterparts 
elsewhere. 
 One partial exception to this approach is the decision of the Supreme Court 
in H v Lord Advocate,86 in which Lord Hope held (applying Lord Justice Laws’ 
obiter dictum in Thoburn)87 that the Scotland Act, as a constitutional statute, could 
not be impliedly repealed. The issue here was whether the Extradition Act 2003, 
which excluded an appeal from the High Court of Justiciary to the Supreme Court 
in relation to a decision under that Act, overrode the provisions in Schedule 6 of 
the Scotland Act for dealing with devolution issues. The court held that they did 
not. Ahmed and Perry argue that Lord Hope’s ruling about the inability to 
impliedly repeal the Scotland Act was itself merely obiter,88 since he ultimately 
found no inconsistency between the two statutes.  However, his reasoning is 
ambiguous, and complicated by the fact that he noted a general presumption of 
statutory interpretation against implied repeal which, he argued, ‘is even stronger 
the more weighty the enactment that is said to have been impliedly repealed’.89 
Though this was ultimately, therefore, a case in which the constitutional status of 
the Scotland Act was relevant to the resolution of the issues before the court, it is 
striking that no attempt was made to link the question of the Scotland Act’s status 
in Thoburn terms to superficially analogous dicta in the early devolution case law. 
B   Review of Acts of the Scottish Parliament 
 If one key issue resolved by Lord Hope in Imperial Tobacco was the 
significance of the constitutional quality of the Scotland Act both for the 
interpretation of that Act and of the legislation made under its authority, a second 
was the approach to be taken to resolving boundary disputes as between reserved 
and devolved matters. In the earlier case of Martin, Lord Hope had already 
eschewed the ‘pith and substance’ approach – common to federal constitutions 
such as Canada as well as to the earlier devolution of legislative powers to 
Northern Ireland under the 1920 Act, and according to which a view is taken as to 
the statute as a whole in order to determine if it sits within or outwith competence 
– in favour of a close reading of the rules set out in the devolution legislation itself. 
As Lord Hope said there, the ‘pith and substance’ test might have informed the 
approach adopted in the modern devolution schemes, but ‘the Scotland Act 
provides its own dictionary’ as to the rules to be applied to the question of 
                                                          
86 [2013] 1 AC 413. 
87 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151. 
88 Farah Ahmed and Adam Perry, ‘Are Constitutional Statutes “Quasi-Entrenched”?’ UK Const L Blog, 
(25 November 2013) (available at: http://ukconstitutionallaw.org). 
89 BH v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 24, 30. 
legislative competence.90 In Imperial Tobacco, Lord Hope restated this principle.91 
The judicial role, he said, was not to determine where legislation is best made – 
that choice has already been made and set out in some considerable detail and 
nuance by the UK Parliament in the Scotland Act – but instead is to apply the rules 
in the 1998 Act ‘bearing in mind that a provision may have a devolved purpose and 
yet be outside competence as it contravenes one of the rules.’92 On one hand this 
principle provides clarity as to how one should identify the ‘purpose’ of a provision 
in order to determine whether that provision ‘relates to’ a reserved matter and 
therefore falls foul of the section 29 test. First because, by rejecting the singular 
approach to the purpose of legislation that characterises the ‘pith and substance’ 
test, the Supreme Court has admitted the possibility that legislation may have more 
than one purpose – in which case ‘the fact that one of its purposes relates to a 
reserved matter will mean that the provision is outside competence’ unless that 
purpose can be shown to be ‘consequential and thus of no real significance’ with 
regard to what the provision ‘overall seeks to achieve.’93 Second, because it clarifies 
factors that may be taken into account when interpreting what is reserved – 
including the headings and sidenotes in schedule 5 as well as the notes which 
accompanied the introduction of the Scotland Bill. Third, because a focus on the 
language of the Scotland Act (which provides a mechanism for determining 
whether legislation is outwith – and not, instead, within – legislative competence) 
clarifies that – ‘within carefully defined limits’ – the devolution scheme was 
intended to be a ‘generous settlement of legislative authority’94 such that the test is 
thought by the relevant legislative actors to give the benefit of the doubt to the 
purpose(s) of ASPs as set forth by the Scottish Government and therefore to 
authority of the devolved institutions.95 On the other hand, however, because the 
‘rules’ set out in the Scotland Act – and the reservations to which those rules attach 
– are at times narrowly construed and technical it has been said that case law on 
the reserved/devolved boundary is of limited value: telling us much about the 
specific reservations upon which a challenge has been raised but leaving to another 
day the proper approach to be taken to the interpretation of the other reservations 
about which there is as yet no case law.96  
 A secondary limitation on reserved competence reflects the fact that – 
whilst not themselves reserved - Scots private law and Scots criminal law 
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encompass a vast range of topics that do not easily or necessarily respect the 
boundaries reserved and devolved matters.97 For that reason, a provision of an 
ASP which ‘makes modifications of Scots private law, or Scots criminal law, as it 
applies to reserved matters’ is to be treated as relating to such matters – and 
therefore outwith the Parliament’s competence – ‘unless the purpose of the 
provision is to make the law in question apply consistently to reserved matters and 
otherwise.’98 This, however, is not the end of the matter: a second, and partially 
overlapping, limitation on competence (found in Schedule 4) provides that an ASP 
‘cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, the law on 
reserved matters’, where the latter formulation includes ‘any enactment the subject 
matter of which is a reserved matter and which is comprised in an Act of 
Parliament or subordinate legislation under an Act of Parliament’ and ‘any rule of 
law which is not contained in an enactment and the subject matter of which is a 
reserved matter.’99 This limitation is subject to two exceptions: the first that it 
‘applies in relation to a rule of Scots private law or Scots criminal law… only to the 
extent to that the rule in question is special to a reserved matter’;100 nor does it 
apply to modifications of the law on reserved matters which ‘are incidental to, or 
consequential on, provision made… which does not relate to reserved matters’ and 
‘do not have a greater effect on reserved matters than is necessary to give effect to 
the purpose of the provision.’101 Though there is a ‘strong family likeness’ between 
the two restrictions on competence, the Supreme Court has clarified that they 
reflect a distinction ‘between a rule of Scots criminal law which is special to a 
reserved matter on the one hand and one which is general in its application on the 
other because it extends to both reserved matters and matters which have not been 
reserved.’102  
In Martin, the court split on the question of whether the provision under 
challenge – section 45 of the Criminal Proceedings etc (Scotland) Act 2007, which 
increased the maximum sentence which court be imposed by the Sheriff Court 
exercising summary jurisdiction – was ‘special to a reserved matter’. The majority 
(including Lord Hope) took the view that it was not, understanding that limitation 
to reflect a desire to prevent ‘the fragmentation of rules of Scots criminal law 
which are of general application into some parts which are within the Scottish 
Parliament’s competence and some parts which are not.’103 Lord Rodger, in the 
minority, expressed the view that ‘a statutory rule of law is “special to a reserved 
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matter” if it has been specially, specifically, enacted to apply to the reserved matter 
in question – as opposed to being a general rule of Scots private or criminal law 
which applies to, inter alia, a reserved matter’.104 At the heart of that disagreement, 
however, lay a deeper tension as to the appropriate extent of judicial control over 
the exercise of devolved powers. Whilst for Lord Hope the Scottish Parliament 
was plainly intended to regulate the Scottish legal system and therefore a ‘generous 
application...which favours competence’ – and which requires the aid of 
Westminster ‘to do no more than dot the i’s and cross the t’s of the necessary 
consequences’ – is to be preferred,105 for Lord Rodger a narrower approach was 
required. According to the latter view the Scottish Parliament is barred from 
‘modifying any enactment which must be taken to reflect the conscious choice of 
Parliament to make special provision for the particular circumstances, rather than 
to rely on some general provision of Scottish private or criminal law.’106 Offering a 
more restrictive approach to the interpretation of ASPs, Lord Rodger continued 
that ‘[w]hether or not to modify such an enactment involves questions of policy 
which must be left for the UK government and Parliament which are responsible 
for the matter.’107 
C   Review across the Devolution Statutes 
 One further question regarding the themes of the case law is that of whether 
the Scottish jurisprudence stands alone or whether the cases discussed below form 
part of a wider ‘devolution jurisprudence’ common to the three nations and 
regions to which power has been devolved; something that is more than the mere 
aggregate of the different decisions made by the various courts regarding the 
relevant provisions of the Scotland, Wales and Northern Irish devolution 
legislation. The question arises in the first place because of devolution’s 
asymmetries. Leaving aside the particular historical factors which made a form of 
consociationalism necessary in Northern Ireland, the Scottish and Welsh models of 
devolution initially differed in fundamental ways: the Welsh Assembly had no 
primary legislative power under the first of the Welsh devolution statutes,108 and 
when it acquired a legislative competence the model used was a ‘conferred powers’ 
one (whereby all was reserved apart from that explicitly devolved),109 in contrast to 
the ‘reserved powers’ model used in Scotland.110 Though both regimes continue to 
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evolve (with the Wales Act 2017 moving the Welsh Assembly to a reserved-powers 
model),111 the numerous differences prevented the early emergence of an over-
arching devolution jurisprudence.112 The possible emergence of such a thing has 
been belatedly facilitated by the use, in the Welsh context, of the power to make a 
reference to the Supreme Court to determine the legality of Acts of the Assembly, 
which has been employed three times since the Assembly acquired powers to make 
primary legislation.113 In its judgment, the Supreme Court drew on the approach 
taken in Martin, though Lord Neuberger noted that despite the close similarity of 
the words used, ‘they are found in different statutes, and one must therefore be 
wary of assuming that they have precisely the same effect’.114 Similarly, Lord Hope 
presented principles developed in the Scottish context as relevant to the question 
of the legislative competence of the Welsh Assembly.115 This willingness to read 
over from the Scottish context to the Welsh one was reaffirmed in the Agricultural 
Sector (Wales) Bill reference,116 where the Supreme Court also confirmed that a 
Bill which relates to a conferred power would be within competence even if ‘in 
principle it might also be capable of being classified as relating to a subject which 
has not been devolved.’117  
This read across has occurred also in the opposite direction: in Christian 
Institute the Supreme Court deliberately wove dicta from the Welsh Agricultural 
Wages reference into that from the challenge to an ASP in Imperial Tobacco in order to 
clarify the proper approach to be taken to the ‘object and purpose’ test when 
determining whether or not devolved legislation ‘relates to’ a reserved matter.118 In 
the Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill case,119 however, Lord 
Mance had pointed out the difficulty of this assimilation, noting that though the 
formulation ‘relates to’ is defined identically in the Scottish and Welsh legislation it 
is ‘used in the Scotland Act 1998 to define not the competence conferred to the 
devolved Parliament, but the competence reserved to the Westminster 
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Parliament.’120 The effect of this distinction was that to give the formulation a 
broad or a narrow interpretation would have opposite effects on the scope of the 
competence of the devolved legislatures: restricting that of the Scottish Parliament 
as it broadened out that of the Welsh Assembly, or vice versa.121 A distinct and 
unitary body of devolution jurisprudence is likely only fully to emerge in the 
context of a unitary approach to devolution such as might be engendered by the 
shift in Wales towards a reserved powers model. 
C   Review Beyond the Scotland Act 1998 
Some of the same dynamics are evident in the courts’ treatment of the question of 
whether the grounds of review enumerated in the Scotland Act are exhaustive of 
those on which the legality of ASPs might be challenged. The argument in AXA 
General Insurance122 that ASPs might be subject to challenge on common law 
grounds of irrationality was only partially successful, the Supreme Court holding 
that the possible grounds of review were more limited both than those which apply 
to executive acts and those which the Outer House of the Court of Session had, by 
analogy with ‘subordinate legislation carrying direct parliamentary approval’, held 
to be appropriate: ‘extremes of bad faith; improper motive or manifest 
absurdity’.123 Instead, it was held, that the degree of common law review 
appropriate for ASPs is the irreducible minimum required to secure the rule of law, 
as understood in the (in)famous dicta of Baroness Hale, Lord Steyn and Lord 
Hope in Jackson v Attorney General.124 In AXA, Lord Hope related this common law 
backstop to the nature and composition of the Scottish Parliament, including the 
feature – its unicameral nature – which most clearly distinguishes it from the 
Westminster Parliament: 
We now have in Scotland a government which enjoys a large majority in the Scottish Parliament. 
Its party dominates the only chamber in that Parliament and the committees by which bills that 
are in progress are scrutinised. It is not entirely unthinkable that a government which has that 
power may seek to use it to abolish judicial review or to diminish the role of the courts in 
protecting the interests of the individual. Whether this is likely to happen is not the point. It is 
enough that it might conceivably do so. The rule of law requires that the judges must retain the 
power to insist that legislation of that extreme kind is not law which the courts will recognise.125 
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 Lord Reed identified a broader basis for common law review of ASPs, 
justified by reference to the principle of legality as applied to the Scotland Act 1998, 
by which the (Westminster) Parliament it created could only have empowered the 
(Scottish) Parliament it created to legislate contrary to certain rights and values had 
it used express words to that effect, words which the 1998 Act does not in fact 
contain: 
Parliament did not legislate in a vacuum: it legislated for a liberal democracy founded on 
particular constitutional principles and traditions. That being so, Parliament cannot be taken to 
have intended to establish a body which was free to abrogate fundamental rights or to violate the 
rule of law.126 
 An implication of this distinction is that a body possessing the same 
majoritarian features as are identified by Lord Hope (features which were of course 
a function of the contingent political circumstances of the period) might – on Lord 
Reed’s account – be granted the power to act incompatibly with the rule of law by 
a statute employing suitably explicit language.127 The basis of Lord Hope’s decision 
is worth dwelling upon, however, for it is striking that many of the most aggressive 
public law decisions in recent decades have demonstrated a similar lack of 
confidence in the ability of the political organs of the state to obstruct the doing of 
illiberal acts or, at times, any act at all which the executive might wish to take. 
Amongst the most quietly scathing of such remarks are those of Lord Steyn in 
Jackson, where the suggestion that ‘the courts may have to qualify a principle [the 
sovereignty of Parliament] established on a different hypothesis of 
constitutionalism’ was linked to the possibility that the availability of judicial review 
is a ‘constitutional fundamental’ which ‘even a sovereign Parliament acting at the 
behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.’128 Given that the 
electoral system employed at the Scottish Parliament makes majority government 
less likely (and effectively excludes the possibility of a party enjoying the sort of 
super-majority which was until recently the norm at Westminster) the fairly casual 
– and not entirely convincing – assimilation of the Scottish with the Westminster 
political apparatus suggests that whether or not the scepticism as to the 
effectiveness of political scrutiny is empirically justified is neither here nor there. 
Judicial power in respect of ASPs, this is to say, has been extended by the Supreme 
Court partly on the basis of a suspicion about the quality of the political elements 
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of the (Scottish) constitutional order which the judgments in AXA do too little to 
substantiate.129  
V   CONCLUSION 
Although fears of ‘un gouvernement des juges’ have proved unfounded, the 
constitutional limits imposed on the Scottish Parliament, and the mechanisms 
established by and in the shadow of the Scotland Act for policing those limits, are 
clearly a fundamentally important feature of the way in which the contemporary 
devolution settlement operates. Perhaps surprisingly, there has been no popular or 
political backlash against the constraints these impose on the Scottish democratic 
process. It is striking that the debates which have arisen regarding judicial power in 
Scotland– who should exercise it; what approach they should take in doing so; how 
far the common law should be allowed to augment the statutory mandate given to 
the courts – have nevertheless not featured a basic question which has defined 
contemporary constitutional debate at the United Kingdom (and, indeed, 
international) level: whether the existence of judicial power to strike down or 
otherwise impugn legislative acts should exist at all.   
 Thus, the reaction of the Scottish Government on those occasions when its 
legislation has been invalidated by the courts has been notably restrained, despite 
occasionally undiplomatic or politically insensitive language from the courts,130 and 
despite the fact that strike down has sometimes caused further significant legal 
headaches.131 As noted above, the major controversy that has arisen has concerned 
the role of the JCPC/Supreme Court in criminal cases, but this was an incidental 
effect of the devolution arrangements, which happened to inflame much longer-
standing nationalist sensitivities (of both political and legal varieties) about the 
‘intrusion’ of London-based courts into Scottish legal affairs.   
 This relative comfort with the judicial role in Scottish political discourse is 
perhaps evidenced most clearly by the Scottish Government’s proposals in advance 
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of the 2014 independence referendum for an interim constitution, as well as an 
‘inclusive and participative’ process for replacing it with a permanent instrument, 
reflecting – said the First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon – ‘the fundamental 
constitutional principle that the people, rather than politicians or state institutions, 
are the sovereign authority in Scotland.’132 That popular sovereignty was reasserted 
by the draft bill itself, which provided that ‘[i]n Scotland, the people have the 
sovereign right to self-determination and to choose freely the form in which their 
State is to be constituted and how they are to be governed’ and that ‘[a]ll State 
power and authority accordingly derives from, and is subject to, the sovereign will 
of the people, and those exercising State power and authority are accountable for it 
to the people.’133 These radical assertions of popular sovereignty were set against 
the claim that the sovereign will of the people was to be expressed in a constitution 
which then limited that sovereign will.134 In the interim constitution the relevant 
limitations were the same as those applicable to the devolved Scottish Parliament: 
Scots law was to be of no effect if incompatible with either EU law or those rights 
under the ECHR specified by the interim constitution.135 These proposals, which 
again were not seriously questioned, seemed to reflect an implicit belief that a 
written constitution (and the judicial power which almost invariably accompanies 
it) is the natural condition of modern polities.136 Thus, in the context of continued 
membership of the UK rather than independence, the major criticism of the role 
of constitutional review concerns, not the existence of limits on the powers of the 
Scottish Parliament, but rather the absence of equivalent constraints on the powers 
of the UK Parliament, particularly insofar as they potentially threaten the security 
of Scottish autonomy.137 
 Attitudes to constitutional review in the Scottish context do therefore seem 
to be indicative of new constitutional thinking which is antithetical to the 
insulation of primary legislation from judicial control. However, the attitudes 
displayed by the courts themselves in exercising their powers of constitutional 
review in the devolved context are more ambivalent. On the one hand, there are 
times at which the courts appear to approach their task self-consciously as one of 
constitutional review – a matter of determining, on a principled basis, the balance of 
control and respect that is due to a primary legislator empowered by a 
constitutional instrument; an attitude which may spill beyond the devolution 
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context to colour (or be coloured by) the courts’ approach to UK Parliament 
legislation as well. The striking similarity of Lord Hope’s reasoning as regards 
common law review of the Scottish Parliament and of the UK Parliament in AXA 
and Jackson is one example; the extension to the Scotland Act of the protection 
from implied repeal due to a constitutional statute is another. On the other hand, 
the statutory basis of the Scotland Act is sometimes seen as decisive, with the 
courts’ powers of review therefore being regarded as no more than the application 
in a novel context of their familiar powers to supervise the legality of acts of 
subordinate bodies. On the whole, more conventional constitutional attitudes have 
been displayed in cases where the practical stakes are higher. This is not unusual in 
constitutional adjudication, particularly in recent UK experience. Nevertheless, it 
may be problematic in a political context in which the constitutional status and 
security of devolution is a highly sensitive issue. Ultimately, the willingness of the 
courts to shift to a new constitutional paradigm which can accommodate the idea 
of the Scottish Parliament as an institution with independent rather than derivative 
(albeit limited) constitutional authority, and which encompasses equivalent 
constraints on the UK Parliament may be an important factor in determining 
whether Scotland’s constitutional future lies inside or outside of the Union. 
